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Abstract David Lewis’ Convention has been a major
source of inspiration for philosophers and social scientists
alike for the analysis of norms. In this essay, I demonstrate
its usefulness for the analysis of some moral norms. At the
same time, conventionalism with regards to moral norms
has attracted sustained criticism. I discuss three major
strands of criticism and propose how these can be met.
First, I discuss the criticism that Lewis conventions analyze
norms in situations with no conflict of interest, whereas
most, if not all, moral norms deal with situations with
conflicting interests. This criticism can be answered by
showing that conventions can emerge in those contexts as
well. Secondly, I discuss the objection that this type of
conventionalism, inspired by Lewis, presents moral norms
as fundamentally contingent, whereas most, if not all,
moral norms are not. However, such critics fail to appre-
ciate that conventions are not radically contingent.
Moreover, if one distinguishes the question as to why an
individual should comply with a norm from the question
whether the norm in question itself can be justified, a core
element of the complaint of contingency disappears. The
third objection to conventionalism concerns the way in
which conventionalists justify norms. I argue that reflection
upon the way in which according to Lewis norms are
justified reveals a fundamental tension in his theory. Pos-
sible solutions to this tension all have in common that the
complaint of contingency returns in some form. Therefore,
this third complaint cannot be avoided altogether.
Keywords Conventions  Norms  David Lewis 
Conventionalism
1 Introduction
In 1969, David Lewis published his seminal work Con-
vention. It has been an influential work in many areas of
philosophy, and it has had a major impact on, at least some,
moral philosophers.1 The reason for this influence is easy
to understand. Convention strongly suggests a model for a
naturalistic account of social norms in the tradition of
Hume.2 It showed how norms can emerge and how they
can have genuine normativity for those participating in
them, without the necessity of invoking normative facts or
other metaphysically suspicious entities.
Conventionalism, as I will call the body of thought
inspired by Lewis, has tried to apply Lewis’ analysis of
linguistic conventions to social norms, most notably, moral
norms. The task for conventionalists is to investigate which
features of moral norms can be explained with the analysis.
Conventionalists vary in how strong they take the analysis
to be. There are those who insist that almost all aspects of
all moral norms can be treated as complex social conven-
tions.3 Others take a more moderate view and argue that
Lewis’ analysis is helpful in explaining some features of
some norms, but not all moral norms.4 Yet others have
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used the analysis to make finer grained distinctions
between kinds of social and moral norms.5 In so far as
moral norms are concerned, most conventionalists agree
that the rules of what Hume calls ‘justice’ in the Treatise
are particularly suitable candidates for a conventionalist
analysis, whereas questions of ‘broad morality’ typically
fall out of the scope of the generalized Lewisian project.6
At the same time, conventionalism has had many
detractors. Moral norms, so these critics argued, cannot be
analyzed analogous to the sort of linguistic conventions that
Lewis described. Three differences seem particularly sig-
nificant. First, whereas linguistic conventions are supposed
to cover situations where there is no conflict of interest,
moral norms guide us especially in situations where there is
considerable conflict. Secondly, linguistic conventions are
just that: conventions. It is just a matter of convention
whether to refer to members of the species of the genus
Equus as ‘horses’ rather than ‘chevaux’. Linguistic rela-
tivism—the notion that linguistic rules vary according to
place, time and history—therefore, is to be expected (and
indeed the case). However, moral norms, like those
requiring people to refrain from murder, for example, are
anything but conventional. Such norms, many argue, are
universal and categorical, rather than peculiar to our society
and relative to our practices. Finally, there is the objection
that conventions cannot be justified in the appropriate
manner. At best one can tell a causal story how a particular
convention came into existence, but one cannot justify that
this is the right convention within Lewis’ theory. However,
moral norms are proper objects of justification and moral
debate. Since moral norms can be justified, it is argued,
moral norms cannot be conventional rules.
In what follows, I will explain how one can answer these
three objections in a Lewisian spirit. In doing so both the
merits as well as the limits of this way of thinking of
morality will become clearer. First, I will rehearse some of
the main steps in Lewis’ analysis of conventions. Next,
applications of these steps to a situation with more conflict
of interest will be introduced. This suggests a principled
reply to the first type of objections. I then turn to the second
criticism that moral norms, unlike conventions, are not
contingent. I will argue that there is a principled response
available for the defender of Lewis. However, this response
turns out to be something of a poison pill, since it points to
an inherent dilemma for Lewis’ analysis. I conclude with
some remarks about the merits of Lewis’ project for moral
philosophy in spite of this dilemma.
2 Lewis conventions
Suppose you and I are to meet each other. For some reason
we did not settle upon a place where we would meet. It is
completely indifferent where we meet, as long as we meet
each other. Where would you go? Since our only concern is
to meet, we are engaged in a pure coordination problem
(see Table 1).7
Standard game theory, at least the sort that was around
when Lewis wrote his dissertation, is unhelpful here. First,
notice that neither you nor I have any independent reason
to go to any of these locations. For neither of us, it is the
case that we have reason to go to any of the locations
regardless of what the other does. In the parlance of game
theory, there is no dominant strategy for either one of us,
nor is there any dominated strategy. In determining where
to go, each of us needs to anticipate the choices of the
other. Secondly, our reasons for going to any of these
locations refer to each other. What reasons are there for my
going to location 1? I have such a reason only if I believe
that you will go to location 1. Why would I believe that?
Well only if I believe that you believe that I will go to
location 1. That is, only if I believe that you have a reason
to go to location 1. What reason do I have for that belief? I
have a reason for this belief, if I believe that you believe
that I believe that you believe that I will go to location 1. In
other words, I have such a reason if I believe that you have
a reason to believe that I have a reason to go to location 1.
My reasons for going to location 1 depend on your reasons
for going to location 1 and vice versa. Our reasons are
interdependent. Consequently, any choice of location looks
arbitrary from the individual’s perspective.8
Table 1 A pure coordination problem
Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Etc.
Location 1 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Location 2 0, 0 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0
Location 3 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1 0, 0
Etc. 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
5 E.g., Elster (2007, pp. 353–371).
6 Hume (2001, III, 2, sections ii–x). The distinction between ‘broad
morality’, i.e., those rules of conduct that guide one’s entire life, and
‘narrow morality’, i.e., the more limited rules of conduct that enable
people to coordinate and cooperate in society comes from Mackie
(1977, ch. 5).
7 A pure coordination problem is a situation of interdependent
decision by two or more agents in which there are multiple proper
equilibria consisting of corresponding strategies, where none of the
agents has a preference for any of these equilibria. And an
equilibrium is ‘proper’ if, for all agents, the equilibrium outcome is
preferable over all other feasible outcomes given the choices of the
other agents. See also Lewis (1969, pp. 14–32).
8 Notice that this interdependency is brought about by the existence
of multiple Nash equilibria and the absence of any dominant strategy.
An outcome is a Nash equilibrium if for each individual it is the case
that they could not have improved their outcomes given the choice of
all other individuals. A strategy is dominant if and only if it is always
gives at least as good an outcome as any other strategy. For precise
definitions, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, sections 1.1–1.2).
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However, in real life, people often have no problem to
coordinate in such situations. In the late 1950s, Thomas
Schelling presented subjects with the problem of meeting
in New York and a surprisingly large number responded
that they would go to Grand Central Station in such a case.9
As is well known, Schelling’s explanation for this obser-
vation was that real people—as opposed to the idealized
agents of game theory—somehow are sensitive to infor-
mation external to the formal description of the game.10
They regard one of the possible equilibria as salient.11
What exactly salience is in this context was relatively
broad. Schelling suggested that it could be some form of
psychological prominence. For example, the human eye is
most sensitive to the color red. Therefore, when asked to
coordinate on a color (‘‘You will each get a reward if you
pick the same color as the other’’), the color red is prom-
inent. However, there are other forms of salience as well
which cannot be explained so easily by reference to psy-
chological prominence. Lewis points out that explicit
agreement and—what is most germane in our context—
precedent are forms of salience as well.12
Be that as it may, what is noteworthy about Schelling’s
explanation is that on his view successful coordination is a-
rational. Standard game-theoretic reasoning does not rec-
ommend any pure strategy over another on the traditional
picture even though coordination is preferable over the
failure of coordination.13
Lewis’ theory of conventions provides a way to allow
such external information to play a role in reasoning about
one’s choice of strategy. The basic idea is presented in the
first two chapters of Convention. Suppose that I believe,
with some sufficient degree of certainty, that you have a
tendency to go to location 1, e.g., because you find it salient
(e.g., you have gone there several times in the past in sit-
uations just like these). Subsequently, I can form the belief
that you believe that I believe that you will go to location 1.
That is, I now have arrived at an additional reason to
believe that you will go to location 1. If that is not enough,
if the weight of these reasons is not sufficient for me to go
to location 1, I can form a belief of yet a higher order and
add to the balance of reasons. At some point, my first order
belief about your tendency to go to location 1 in combi-
nation with these higher-order beliefs will be sufficient
reason for me to go to location 1.14 In other words, what
Lewis argued is that higher-order beliefs can add to the
weight of reasons for a choice of strategy. The formation of
these higher-order beliefs is justified according to Lewis if
the salience of location 1, as well as the structure of the
game and that we are rational, is common knowledge
between us.15 That is, because I know that you know that I
know … that location 1 is salient, I can infer that you
believe that I believe that you will go to location 1—and
similarly for all higher-order beliefs.
These two ideas, the notion that higher-order reasons
can add to the weight of first order reasons and the claim
that salience can be a first-order reason when it is object of
common knowledge are the fundamental improvements
upon Schelling’s explanation. With these additions, it
seems that the individuals in Schelling’s experiments were
far from a-rational. Instead, they used commonly known
clues about each other’s tendencies to reason correctly to a
choice of strategy.
Suppose the members of a group manage to coordinate
successfully on an occasion. There now is a precedent.
Suppose that members of the same group encounter a
similar coordination problem. Lewis suggests that the
precedent will make one of the coordination equilibria
salient, thus reinforcing the tendency of agents to do their
9 Schelling (1960, p.58). His respondents were all students at Yale in
the late 1950’s. Grand Central Station was the place where most of
them would arrive in New York.
10 The formal description of a game consists of three elements. The
(finite) set of individual players i [ I; a pure strategy space for each
individual Si and payoff functions ui that assigns an individual i a
utility for each strategy profile s = (s1, s2, s3, …). All information
about the strategy labels the individuals use (e.g., ‘location 1’ or
‘Grand Central Station’), or further characterizations of the strategy
profiles (e.g., ‘we all pick red’, or ‘we all go to Grand Central
Station’) beyond these three elements is excluded from the formal
description of a game. Schelling’s point is that agents use such
excluded information to coordinate their actions.
11 Strictly speaking, only combinations of strategies are equilibria.
Outcomes are not equilibria, though they can be the result of
equilibrium strategies. In this essay, I will be less strict. Sometimes I
will refer to strategies as an equilibrium and sometimes I will refer to
an outcome as an equilibrium. It will be clear in the context which of
these two usages are meant. Nothing important depends on this—
admittedly sloppy—use of terminology. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for pointing this out to me.
12 Lewis (1969, pp. 33–41); Mehta et al. (1994a; b) demonstrate that
there are forms of salience that are intrinsically conventional. See also
Postema’s contribution to this volume.
13 One referee reminded me that standard game theory in this case
recommends following a mixed strategy: agents are recommended to
randomize over the available strategies with equal probabilities.
Randomization does not ensure that coordination will result. What is
more, mixed strategies are suspicious as rational recommendation in
coordination games in any case since if others follow the equilibrium
Footnote 13 continued
mixed strategy I can expect the same pay-off regardless which
strategy I follow.
14 A first-order belief is a normal belief about some state of affairs; a
second-order belief is a belief about a first-order belief; ...; an n-order
belief is a belief about a belief of the order n-1. Lewis (1969, pp. 28–
32).
15 To be precise, in addition to common knowledge of the salience of
location 1, we need to have common knowledge of the nature of our
predicament (that we want to coordinate) and of our rationality (to
allow for robust predictions of each other’s conclusions) as well as
our inductive standards and background information (Lewis 1969, p.
52–56).
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part to realize this outcome.16 If members of a group reg-
ularly coordinate successfully, they will start to notice this
regularity. Consequently, they will develop a conditional
preference for conforming to this regularity. Members
typically prefer to conform to the regularity if others do so
as well. Since there is this regularity, a general expectation
that people will conform is formed. Consequently, a stable
pattern of behavior emerges that is based on the general
expectation of each group member about the typical way
that others will behave. At that point a convention has
emerged. If people like you and me often miss each other
in New York City, we will go to Grand Central Station. It
will be the convention to go there in such cases. Lewis’
famous definition of a convention is the following:
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a
population P when they are agents in a recurrent
situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that,
and it is common knowledge in P that, in almost any
instance of S among members of P,
(1) almost everyone conforms to R;
(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to
conform to R;
(3) almost everyone has approximately the same prefer-
ences regarding all possible combinations of actions;
(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to
R, on condition that almost everyone conform to R;
(5) almost everyone would prefer that anyone more
conform to R0 on condition that almost everyone
conform to R0;17
where R0 is some possible regularity in the behavior
of members of P in S, such that almost no one in
almost any instance of S among members of P could
conform both to R0 and to R (Lewis 1969, p. 78).
Thus, there is a convention to meet each other in Grand
Central Station if (1) we, and others like us, meet each
other in the situation of Table 1 in Grand Central Station
and we do so regularly, because (2) we expect each other to
do so (for example, because we have met here the last
couple of times), and (3) we all have an interest in meeting
each other, and, (4) even though we are indifferent where
we will meet, we would prefer that we meet in Grand
Central Station, on the condition that almost everyone
would go to Grand Central Station in such cases and (5) it
is the case that we, and all others like us, would prefer to
meet on, say, Times Square, if that is where people would
go when they loose each other in New York City.
Lewis’ analysis of conventions then achieves something
remarkable. It shows, first, that conventions help to solve
coordination problems. Secondly, it shows that conventions
emerge in recurring coordination problems. Thirdly, it
avoids any dubious functionalism. Conventions do not
emerge because they fulfill a beneficial function for a
population. Instead, Lewis provides an explanation which
firmly bases both the answer as to why conventions emerge
as well as why people comply with these conventions in a
theory that does justice to individual intentionality and
rationality.
These features explain the attractiveness of the sugges-
tion that moral norms could be analyzed as conventions. A
moral agent is a person who acts as morality dictates him.
He does not merely conform to the requirements of
morality. An agent could conform for reasons that have
nothing to do with the fact that an action is required. In
contrast, the reasons of a moral agent for acting morally are
precisely that his actions are required by morality. That is,
a moral agent complies with morality. For example, a
moral agent does not refrain from cheating others simply
because it is inconvenient or because it would ruin his
reputation. A moral agent does not cheat others because he
should not. This is a central feature of moral norms and it is
the task of ethical theory to explain this feature. This is a
difficult task because compliance seems problematic from
the point of view of rationality. Suppose that a moral norm
requires the agent to u. Then, either there are independent
reasons to u, in which case the fact that a norm requires the
agent to u is irrelevant.18 Or, there are no independent
reasons to u, in which case it is hard to see how the mere
fact that a norm requires it makes u-ing rational. In other
words, a moral norm is irrelevant for a rational agent or it is
irrational.19
This dilemma could be avoided if one tinkered with the
notion of rationality, so as to render compliance rational
and vindicate the rationality of moral norms. However, for
those who are reluctant to reject the instrumentalist notion
of rationality as it is expressed in standard rational choice
theory, conventionalism suggests another way of avoiding
the dilemma. Consider the reasons of an agent to go to
location 1. There are no independent reasons that tell him
to go to any of these locations in particular. The only
independent reason there is to meet with the other agent.
However, the existence of a convention gives the agent
reasons to go to location 1. The reason of our agent to go to
location 1 is that in those situations there is a convention to
go to location 1. The agent, therefore, complies with the
convention in going to location 1. Such compliance is not
16 Lewis (1969, pp. 36–42).
17 Note that (5) requires that there be multiple equilibria.
18 Independent, that is, from the fact that the norm requires the agent
to u.
19 McClennen and Shapiro (1998).
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irrational, nor is the convention irrelevant for the ratio-
nality of going to location 1. So, if a similar story could be
constructed for other norms one could vindicate the ratio-
nality of compliance with these norms.
3 A Refinement of Lewis’ Definition
Before considering whether Lewis’ analysis of conventions
is applicable to other, especially moral, contexts, we need
to make two modifications on Lewis’ definition. A con-
vention, on Lewis definition, is a species of convergence in
behavior. However, such a convergence in behavior often
is a sign that agents are following a norm, but it is not itself
a norm. A (temporary) disruption of the norm is not suf-
ficient for the non-existence of a norm. Norms can be
violated after all—even on a relatively large scale. Fur-
thermore, there can be all kinds of reasons why the
behavior of agents converges. Some subjects in Schelling’s
experiment may have preferred to go to Grand Central
Station because they admired the architecture. Others may
have opted for Grand Central Station without any thought;
sheer habit may have led them to go there. For these rea-
sons it is probably better to think of conventions as (part of)
the (justifying) reason for agents to display such converg-
ing behavior.20 Consequently, we will have to formulate
Lewis’ definition of a convention as expectations about
behavior rather than actual behavior.
This modification is in the spirit of Lewis’ analysis as he
calls attention to the mental states of the agents conforming
to a convention and makes these part of his definition. The
emphasis on the agents’ preferences and their beliefs, espe-
cially, their common knowledge, simply is an emphasis on
the reasons of the agents for conforming to the convention.
The second point we need to make is about condition (3)
which requires that all agents have similar preferences for
all combinations of outcomes. This seems overly restric-
tive. Lewis’ focus was on linguistic rules where the
underlying interests of all concerned resemble (pure)
coordination problems. However, if one wishes to extend
the analysis to other types of norms, including moral ones,
and other types of interaction problems, we need to drop
this condition. So from here on, I will assume that this is
not a necessary condition for the existence of a convention.
4 Conventions in Situations of Conflicting Interest
It might be argued that regularities in behavior modeled
after Lewis conventions are not relevant for ethics. One
reason for such sentiments might be the following. Moral
norms have a ‘point’. They are invoked of situations of
potential conflict of interest. They help avoiding threaten-
ing sub-optimality. Edna Ullmann-Margalit has argued that
this is the raison d’eˆtre of moral norms.21 The most
notorious of such situations is, without doubt, the pris-
oner’s dilemma. Ullmann-Margalit argued that moral
norms are commitment devices that prevent agents from
‘cheating’ or ‘free riding’ in prisoner’s dilemmas. The
prisoner’s dilemma falls outside of the scope of Lewis’
definition of a convention, because the single equilibrium
in this situation (therefore (5) is not met) is the result of the
dominant strategies of the agents. That is to say, the
equilibrium is such that agents have reason to choose their
equilibrium strategy regardless whether others do so as
well. Therefore, they need not expect others to conform as
well (as required by (2)), nor is it the case that the agents
prefer anyone to conform to their equilibrium strategies,
provided others do so as well (as required by (4)). If any-
thing, agents would prefer others not to choose the
equilibrium strategy as this opens up the possibility of
‘cheating’.
However, Lewis’ analysis can be used to demonstrate
that conventions in prisoner’s dilemmas are solutions to a
coordination problem as well. Furthermore, with a few
adaptations, Lewis’ analysis can be used to demonstrate
that in a prisoner’s dilemma conventions focusing on the
Pareto-optimal outcome can emerge. Finally, I will suggest
that some of these conventions are moral norms, thus
vindicating my suggestion in the introduction that at least
some moral norms are conventional.
Consider Hume’s famous example of the two farmers
who are considering whether to help each other reap their
harvests:
Your corn is ripe to-day; mine will be so tomorrow.
‘Tis profitable for us both, that I shou’d labour with
you to-day, and that you shou’d aid me to-morrow. I
have no kindness for you, and know you have as little
for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your
account; and shou’d I labour with you upon my own
account, in expectation of a return, I know I shou’d
be disappointed, and that I shou’d in vain depend
upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour
alone: You treat me in the same manner. The seasons
change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of
mutual confidence and security. (Hume 2001, III,
2, v)
If each attempts to harvest their corn without help, they
will not be able to bring in all the corn in time before the
storm. If they help each other, they can work more
20 I argue for this in more detail in Verbeek (2007). See also Den
Hartogh (2002). 21 Ullmann-Margalit (1977). For similar views, see Mackie (1977).
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efficiently and both their harvests are saved. Toiling the
land, however, is hard work and both would prefer help
with their own harvest but not to come to the aid of the
other.
I will ignore the aspect of timing that is clearly present
in Hume’s example. I pretend that the farmers somehow
help each other simultaneously.22 Then we have a standard
two-person prisoner’s dilemma:
Table 2 Prisoner’s dilemma
B
Mutual aid No aid
A
Mutual aid (2, 2) (0, 3)
No aid (3, 0) (1, 1)
The farmers could promise to help each other, but why
would they honor such a promise in the absence of external
enforcement? For with a promise it still is the case that the
dominant strategy for A and B is not to provide aid to the
other. Perhaps it could be argued that it is morally required
that they both assist each other. Again, why would A and B
comply with such a norm? However, if we can show that in
such situations there could be a convention to assist each
other, the idea that A and B should comply with the con-
ventional norm to assist each other is not so strange. It
would lend credence to conventionalism.
If this is a situation that occurs only once, a convention
cannot emerge. Both A and B will not help each other, thus
realizing a sub-optimal outcome. This is their dominant
choice. In this case there is no convention possible as we
saw above. So it seems as if Lewis conventions can emerge
only in contexts of (pure) coordination problems. However,
this is too fast. In order to see that even in prisoner’s
dilemmas conventions of mutual aid can emerge, let us
introduce some plausible assumptions about the context of
the problem for the farmers.
First, I will assume that this situation arises more often
than once. There are many situations like this occurring
within this community. That is, this is a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma.23 It is unrealistic to assume that agents in such a
population will meet each other in an infinite number of
occasions—after all, as the song goes, ‘we all have to go
sometime’. However, few of us, if any, know when. So, let
us assume that when two agents from this community are
engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma, there is a probability p
(0 B p \ 1) that they will meet each other again in a
similar situation. For example, in a community of farmers
in which A and B have the option for mutual aid, there will
be a new season with new harvests and new opportunities
for mutual aid. However, there is no guarantee that A and B
will be in this situation again. For example, A or B (or,
indeed, both) may give up farming and leave the commu-
nity.24 In such a repeated game, there is a plethora of
possible strategies that could be followed by each of the
agents. In order to facilitate the analysis I will restrict the
class of repeated prisoner’s dilemmas to that class where
strategies other than ‘never assist’ could emerge as well.
Therefore, the third assumption that I will make is that each
member of the community stands to gain something by
cooperating and giving mutual aid. This is only the case if
the average number of rounds is large enough. To this end,
I will assume that p [ 1/3. This means that the average
number of times n that A and B will be able to help each
other with the harvest in this manner is 2 or more.25 If
p B 1/3, the average number of rounds equals 1 and the
agents are in fact playing one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas
with each other and no convention could emerge.
Finally, I have to introduce an assumption that Lewis
does not make, but it seems relatively harmless in the
present context. Individuals tend to remember the actions
of others with whom they interacted. In other words,
people can form a reputation in this context.26
If these four assumptions are made, it looks like all
kinds of cooperative strategies could emerge. Perhaps the
most famous among them is tit-for-tat (TFT).27 TFT starts
out with cooperation and repeats the move of the other
player in each subsequent round. Let n be the number of
the round, then TFT plays cooperate in n = 1 and in each
subsequent round n [ 1, TFT repeats the move of the
opponent in n-1. TFT is an equilibrium in the repeated
finite prisoner’s dilemma of which the repeated harvest
conundrum is an example. That is, TFT is a strategy such
that if it is followed in this population, neither A nor B
22 Gauthier (1986, ch. 6) and McClennen (1990) have argued, on
independent grounds, that the removal of this sequential aspect really
matters. They offer arguments as to why the farmers should cooperate
in a single sequential prisoner’s dilemma. I ignore this complication
in this paper.
23 This assumption is in line with Lewis’ own thinking as he claims
that precedence is one of the most common forms of salience.
24 Let n be the number of the rounds A and B interact. Then, there is
a chance pn-1 that A and B will face each other again in such a
situation. Since 0 \ p \ 1, pn-1?0 for large n.
25 Suppose that p = 1/3. If A and B meet each other, the number of
rounds that they will meet each other in total will be n = 1 + 1/
3 + (1/3)2 + (1/3)3 +….+ (1/3)n ? 1.5 Since n is an integer, it will
equal 2.
26 This is misleading, for a reputation is not the same thing as a
register of past actions. See Morris (1999) on this. I ignore this issue
here.
27 See Axelrod (1981); Axelrod and Hamilton (1981); Axelrod
(1984); Axelrod (1986).
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could improve given the choice of the other for TFT. The
proof is simple and well-known.28 Suppose B plays TFT
and A knows this. Then in round i, independent of the
value of i, these two questions must have a determinate
answer: (1) if B will cooperate in i, can it be part of a best
reply for A to cooperate as well? (2) If B will defect in i,
can it be part of a best reply for A to cooperate in that
round? Suppose the answer to (1) is ‘‘Yes’’, then let i = 1.
But if A cooperates in i = 1 then B will cooperate in i = 2
as well. So in i = 2 the situation is identical to i = 1. Once
again it will be your best reply to cooperate in i = 2. Thus
if the answer to (1) is ‘‘Yes’’ cooperating in every round is
your best reply against TFT.
Suppose however the answer is ‘‘No’’, then any best
reply to TFT must defect in i = 1, this ensures that B will
defect in i = 2. Now what to do? Depending on the answer
to question (2) A must defect if it is ‘‘No’’ and cooperate if
it is ‘‘Yes’’. If it is ‘‘No’’ A’s best reply to TFT is always
defect. This is strategy D. If it is ‘‘Yes’’ B will cooperate in
i = 3 which brings A again in the same situation as in (1)
where i = 1, so A must defect again. A’s best reply then
would be to alternate between defect and cooperate starting
with defection in i = 1. Let us call this strategy A.
We can calculate the expected utility of each of these
strategies playing against TFT using the values of Table 2:
E(TFT, TFT) = 2ð1 þ p þ p2 þ p3 þ :::Þ ¼ 2=ð1  pÞ
E(D, TFT) = 3 þ p þ p2 þ p3 þ ::: ¼ 2 þ ð1=ð1  pÞÞ
E(A, TFT) = 3 þ 3p2 þ 3p4::: ¼ 3=ð1  p2Þ
Since p [ 1/3, E(TFT,TFT) [ E(D,TFT) and E(TFT,TFT)
[ E(A,TFT). This means that TFT is better than D or A
against itself. But, given our answers to (1) and (2), one of
these three strategies must be a best reply against TFT.
Therefore, TFT is a best reply against itself. From this it
follows that TFT is an equilibrium. Given that others are
following TFT, there is no reason to prefer to pursue another
strategy than TFT, since TFT does at least as well as any other
strategy in such a population.
However, this is not enough to show that TFT is a
possible Lewis convention in this population. TFT could
not satisfy condition (4) of Lewis’ definition. Given the
assumptions it cannot be the case that each prefers that any
one more conforms to TFT when almost everyone con-
forms to TFT. In a population of TFT players, a strategy of
unconditional cooperation C (‘always cooperate, no matter
what the other has done in the previous round’) does as
well as TFT and there is no reason for TFT players to
prefer others to follow TFT rather than C.29 In game the-
oretic terms, TFT is not stable.30
However, suppose that the agents in this population are
not perfect in the execution of their strategies.31 They
sometimes make mistakes. Now TFT is no longer an
equilibrium because it is no longer a best reply to itself
when a mistake has been made. Suppose two TFT players
play against each other and one of them makes a mistake;
he defects. In the next round his opponent will react by
defecting while he himself will cooperate since his oppo-
nent cooperated in the previous round. In the following
round this will be reversed, and so on. The two contestants
will be locked in a cooperate-defect sequence (in other
words, they play strategy A) and could end up in an
‘‘always defect’’ sequence if another mistake is made.32
Consider then the class of strategies T. A member of this
class is T1. This strategy copes with the possibility of
mistakes. It implies the concept of good standing. A player
who is in good standing is entitled to expect cooperation
from his opponent. At the beginning of a sequence each
player is in good standing and remains so, provided each
player always cooperates when T1 prescribes this. If any
player defects though T1 tells him to cooperate, he looses
his good standing. He regains it if he cooperates uncondi-
tionally in one subsequent round: hence the name T1. There
are of course other strategies using good standing, T2, T3,
T4, etc., which make up the class of strategies T. These
strategies demand two, three, four, or more rounds of
cooperation before the other player regains good standing.
T1 can be described as ‘‘Cooperate if your opponent is in
good standing, or if you are not; otherwise defect’’. The
only difference between TFT and T1 is in the moves after a
player has made a mistake and defected. Unlike ‘‘normal’’
TFT, T1 is stable. The proof is similar to the argument used
to show that TFT is an equilibrium. When you go into
round i, three situations are possible: (1) both you and your
28 See Axelrod (1981); Axelrod and Hamilton (1981).
29 In other words, condition (4) of Lewis’ definition requires that a
convention is a uniquely optimal reply against itself. Let I be a
strategy and E(I, J) denote the expected utility of playing I in a
population that follows J. On Lewis’ definition I is a convention only
if E(I,I) [ E(J,I) where I = J. This is stronger than simply requiring
that a convention be an equilibrium in a game, since I is an
equilibrium only if E(I,I) C E(J,I). Also, it is stronger than requiring
that a convention is an evolutionary stable strategy (Smith 1982).
30 A strategy is stable if and only if it either is the only best reply
against itself, or if it is a best reply against itself, but a better reply
against those other strategies. More precise, a strategy is stable if and
only if: (1) E(I,I) C E(I,J), and (2) either E(I,I) [ E(I,J) or
E(I,J) [ E(J,J) (Smith 1982, p. 10; Sugden 1986, pp. 28–29).
31 In what follows, I am taking up a suggestion of Sugden (1986).
32 In Axelrod’s computer tournament exactly such a deadlock ending
in continuous mutual defection happened between TFT and the
strategy called JOSS. JOSS played tit-for-tat but defected occasion-
ally (10% of the time). One could say, it made a mistake 10% of the
time. See Axelrod (1984, pp. 36–38).
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opponent are in good standing or neither of you is. Then
your opponent will cooperate in i and thereafter repeat your
last move (play TFT); (2) your opponent is in good
standing but you are not. Your opponent will defect in i and
thereafter repeat your last move; (3) you are in good
standing but your opponent is not. He will cooperate in i
and cooperate in i + 1 and thereafter repeat your last
move.
Situation (1) is the case in round 1. Here you should play
TFT. We have seen this before. The proof is the same as
the proof given above. In situation (2) if you cooperate in i
you will be in situation (1) in i + 1. If you defect you will
still be in (2) in i + 1. So if it is the best move to defect in
i, it must be so in i + 1, i + 2, .... Two sequences then are
possible: cooperate, cooperate, cooperate, ..., or defect,
defect, defect, .... Since the former gives higher utility (this
is implied in the condition of possible mutual cooperation
p [ 1/3), your best choice in (2), as in (1), is to cooperate.
Finally, in (3) you are free to defect one round since in
i + 1 you are again in (1). And in (1) your best choice was
to cooperate. This shows that T1 is in equilibrium. It also
shows that it satisfies Lewis’ condition (4), for it is the
unique best reply against itself once there is a small
probability of making mistakes in the execution of the
strategy.33 However, it is not the only possible convention.
D is now a possible convention as well in this model. If you
know the other player will continue to defect regardless of
his standing, your unique best reply is to continue to defect
as well.
T1 is a convention. It satisfies all elements of the mod-
ified definition. There are more possible conventions
besides T1 and D. T2, T3, T4, ..., Tr, ... all can be stable.
34
T1, when adopted in this population, satisfies the central
requirements of Lewis’ definition. First, if T1 is adopted,
requirement (1) almost everyone conforms to T1, is met—
be it by stipulation. Note that because of the possibility of
mistakes, even the ‘almost’ clause is satisfied. Second, (2)
almost everyone expects almost everyone to conform to T1,
is satisfied too, since T1 is an equilibrium. Third, (3) almost
everyone has approximately the same preferences regard-
ing all possible combinations of actions, is of course not
satisfied. However, that is no problem, since it was dropped
from the definition of a convention. Fourth, (4) almost
everyone prefers that almost everyone conform to T1 on the
condition that almost everyone conform to T1, is satisfied as
well, since T1 is an equilibrium for (almost) all agents in
the population. Finally, (5) almost everyone would prefer
that any one more conform to Tn, on condition that almost
everyone conform to Tn, is satisfied since we saw that T1 is
not the only possible stable equilibrium.
We can conclude that even in (repeated) situations of
considerable conflict of interest, where there are strong
incentives for cheating, Lewis conventions could exist. The
rule of good standing is an, admittedly crude, example of
norms that regulate interactions in such situations have a
conventional character. Other game theoretic situations
have been analyzed along these lines as well.35
5 Intermezzo: Conventions and Moral Norms
Let us pause for a moment and see where the argument has
brought us. Are we able to explain some features of moral
norms along these lines? On the modified definition of
convention, a convention is a stable pattern of interde-
pendent expectations of behavior. The existence of such a
pattern is a rule of conduct, a norm, in the group in ques-
tion. For example, if we apply this to the case of the
farmers, T1 is the rule that says that a farmer ought to
provide assistance, provided the other does so as well. One
could argue that this rule is also a moral rule as most
systems of morality have such norms of mutual assistance.
Alternatively, one could interpret T1 as the rule that
promises of mutual assistance are binding. If A announces
to B that he promises to help B with his harvest on the
condition that she help him, he is announcing that he is
following T1. As we saw above, the unique best reply to T1
is to follow T1 as well, so we can see how mutual promises
of mutual assistance are really binding. Therefore, the
content of a convention can be identical to the content of a
moral norm, as the convention of mutual assistance in the
farmer example suggests.
What is more, the analysis enables us to make sense of
an aspect of moral motivation. Moral agents, it is said,
comply with their duty, because it is their duty.36 They
don’t merely conform to their duty and act in accordance
with the norm. In moral agents, the norm itself is the reason
for acting. Note that the analysis of T1 in the previous
section can explain how this could be rational. T1 is such
that compliance (and not just conformity) with it is
rational. My reason to comply with T1 is that others expect
me to do so as well. In other words, the reason to comply
with T1 is that it is the established conventional rule.
Conventional rules are action-guiding just like moral
33 In the language of game theory T1 is a trembling hand perfect
equilibrium in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma and TFT is not.
34 However, not all strategies of the class T are stable. If r is very
large, it may pay to switch to play D against such a strategy,
depending on the chance of future interactions and the values of
Table 2. See Sugden (1986, p. 115).
35 E.g., Sugden (1986); Binmore (1993); Binmore (1994); Skyrms
(1996); Binmore (1998); Den Hartogh (1998, 2002); Verbeek
(2002b); Kuhn (2004); Skyrms (2004).
36 This is a familiar claim in many traditions of ethical theorizing as
diverse as that of Kant, Aristotle and Hume.
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norms purport to be. This is one of the major attractions of
the conventionalist analysis.37
However, it is not sufficient to show that a conventional
rule can have the same content as a moral norm and be
action-guiding in much the same way. Moral norms have
additional features which show up when agents deviate
from the norm. If a rule is a moral norm, deviance usually
is met with criticism, with resentment and indignation.
Lewis argued that all conventions become social norms
because they are socially enforced because of these forms
of criticism.38 Deviation from the convention will provoke
a negative response from the other group members,
because they preferred the deviant to act differently and
will think badly of him, especially if the deviance is not the
result of excusable ignorance or duress.39 Therefore, this
third element, the fact that deviation is met with criticism,
can also be explained within a conventionalist theory.
However, it seems crucial for moral norms that this
negative response is regarded as justified by those con-
cerned. One could argue that the negative response itself is
required by another convention, which gives agents reasons
to utter criticism and the like. However, that sets up a
regress of interlinking conventions. Each conventional rule
has its own conventional rule that requires criticism when it
is broken. And of course this second conventional rule has
its own rule about what to do if criticism is not forth-
coming, etc., etc. It is unclear whether such a regress is
vicious and it would certainly be compatible within a
broadly conventionalist theory.
Alternatively, one could look elsewhere to justify this
negative response. Elsewhere, I have argued that the
resentment and indignation with which deviations from a
norm are met as well as the guilt that moral agents expe-
rience when they violate a norm (without an excuse)
presupposes the existence of such virtues as trustworthiness
and fairness.40 The introduction of such virtues is not
incompatible with the idea that some moral norms are
conventions. In fact, it reinforces the point, since trust-
worthiness and fairness are responses to expectation about
one’s behavior. A trustworthy agent will act as she is
expected to by the person who puts his trust in her. A fair
agent will not let down others who rely on her to do as they
expect.41 These expectations are the result of the estab-
lished norms and conventions. Such virtues, then, are not
ad hoc assumptions in a conventionalist theory of moral
norms.
We can conclude that the conventionalist analysis has
many interesting things to say about moral norms. This
makes the objections against conventionalism all the more
important. In the next section, I return to them.
6 Are Lewis Conventions Contingent?
Given all this it is tempting to suppose that at least some
moral norms are conventional in Lewis’ sense. The fact
that Lewis explicitly restricted his analysis to games of
(pure) coordination is not a reason to suppose that only
linguistic rules are Lewis conventions. However, this has
not been the most important criticism. The most funda-
mental objection to the conventionalist project in moral
philosophy is that it renders moral norms completely
contingent.
Consider the repeated prisoner’s dilemma I analyzed
above. There, T1, T2, T3, ..., etc., are all possible conven-
tions. So if moral norms are conventional in Lewis’ sense,
it turns out that other moral norms applying to the same
situation are possible as well. It seems a purely contingent
fact that T1 emerged. However, moral norms, it is generally
believed, are not contingent in this manner. Consider a
fundamental norm, like the one that prohibits murder. It is
not by accident that many (if not all) existing moral codes
have such a norm. Secondly, given the many possible
conventions, Lewisian conventionalism about moral norms
seems to imply moral relativism. Which conventional
moral norm emerges seems to be bound to contingent
factors of the environment and population in which the
convention developed. That is not how we think of our
moral norms. Moral norms are necessary in some funda-
mental sense. The same point can be made in less abstract
terms. What could be the alternative convention to the
norm that forbids murder? How could murder be anything
but wrong? Nevertheless, this norm would be contingent if
37 This also goes some way to show that game theory does have
interesting things to say about moral motivation. Often rational choice
theorists will claim that moral considerations need to be treated either
as inputs in the preference structure of the agents, or as available
strategies in the game. The conventionalist analysis shows is that
there is another way to account for moral motivation in game theory,
namely by focusing on the nature of the reasons of agents to adopt the
stable equilibrium strategy. In the example of T1 it is not because the
agents have moral preferences that they comply to the norm of mutual
assistance, nor because there is a ‘moral strategy’ in their strategy
space. Moral reasons, the analysis T1 of suggests, could be treated as
interdependent reasons for action. See also Den Hartogh (2002) and
Verbeek (2002a, 2007).
38 Lewis (1969, pp. 99–100).
39 Similar arguments are made by Sugden (1986, pp. 159–161).
Lewis also argued that all established conventions become social
norms in this way, but that is an exaggeration. It may be a
conventional rule to warn people for the poisonous contents of a
bottle with chemicals with a sticker with a skull and bones on a
yellow background, but if I write in clear luminescent characters
POISON I need not expect a negative response from others.
40 In Verbeek (2002b, ch. 2 and 4). See also Den Hartogh (2002) and
Michael Bacharach (2006, ch. 1).
41 Verbeek (2002b, ch. 4, 2007).
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it were a convention. Therefore, moral norms cannot be
analyzed as Lewis conventions.
The force of this objection should not be exaggerated.
First, note that on conventional analysis it is not the case
that ‘anything goes’. Some outcomes could never be
achieved (e.g., an outcome where I always cheat and you
always cooperate in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma). Lewis’
analysis sets clear boundaries on what could possibly be a
convention. The contingency is not radical. Secondly, it is
not true that all conventions are completely contingent.
Coordination problems can have superior and inferior
equilibria. It is conventional whether we call Felis catus a
‘cat’ or ‘un gatto’, but a 26 syllable name for this creature
is an inferior naming convention. If we loose each other in
New York City, we could meet at Grand Central Station or
on Times Square, but a convention to meet somewhere in
New Jersey is an inferior convention. Therefore, in many
cases the possible range of conventions is further delimited
by such considerations of superiority.42 Third, it could be
argued that even such fundamental norms as the one pro-
hibiting murder contain conventional elements. Murder is
the intentional killing of innocent people. What counts as
intentional killing? Who are to be included among the
innocent? Is this norm without exceptions? Are all killings
of innocent people prohibited (for example, think of cases
of voluntary euthanasia)? Does the norm apply equally to
all members of a community, or does it allow room for
certain people to intentionally kill an innocent person? It is
said that in some societies rulers were not prohibited to kill
innocent people, while private citizens were not exempted
from the prohibition. Furthermore, since these elements
vary, it seems that the universality of the prohibition of
murder is at best abstract and formal—not substantial.43
However, the defender of the idea that moral norms are
Lewis conventions has a more fundamental reply to this
line of criticism. Remember that for Lewis a convention
can emerge when a course of action is salient and this
salience is object of common knowledge. Lewis, like
Schelling before him, is broad-minded as to what can make
a strategy salient. He discusses psychological factors,
precedence and explicit agreement as examples of how a
strategy can become salient. However, it seems not nec-
essary to stop here. An outcome can become salient as a
result of moral reasons other than the norm that is supposed
to emerge like a convention. For example, the outcome
where parties mutually refrain from murder is morally
salient because it has the unique feature that no harm is
inflicted, or because it is the unique outcome where the
sanctity of life is respected. If we include moral reasons in
the factors that can contribute to the salience of an out-
come, the resulting convention will not be contingent in an
objectionable manner. For this reply to work it is necessary
that the norm that this is required is not itself among the
moral reasons that contribute to the salience of an outcome.
Otherwise, the conclusion that the norm is a Lewis con-
vention does nothing to explain the nature of the norm in
question. So it seems that the defender of Lewis has a
strong response to the objection that such a conventionalist
analysis renders moral norms objectionably contingent.
7 A Dilemma for Lewisian Conventionalists
This reply, however, is a Trojan horse. As I will argue
below, it gives rise to a dilemma for Lewis’ analysis of
conventions. The most obvious way to escape this dilemma
brings back the criticism of contingency in full force.
Consider an agent A who has to make a choice between
‘top’ (T) and ‘bottom’ (B) in the following simple pure
coordination problem.
Table 3 2 by 2 Coordination game
B
L R
A
T 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 1
Suppose that ‘top left’ (TL) is salient (for example,
because TL is morally salient). On Lewis theory A is
rationally justified in choosing T. Why? T is salient. That is
of itself not enough reason to choose T, though it is part of
the reason for T. Suppose that A believes that B believes
that A finds T salient, then, in addition to the salience of T,
there is a further reason for A to choose T. And if A has
other higher-order beliefs, he could infer another, further
reason to choose T. As a result, on Lewis’ account, coor-
dinating on TL is rational and the justification as to why
this is the case rests on the idea that higher-order expec-
tations can inform lower-order expectations:
So if I somehow happen to have an nth-order
expectation about action in this two person coordi-
nation problem, I may work outward through the
nested replications to lower- and lower-order expec-
tations about action. Provided I go on long enough,
and provided all the needed higher-order expectations
about preferences and rationality are available, I
42 Thanks to one of the referees of Topoi who reminded me of this.
However, it is not necessary that only superior coordination equilibria
will be selected. See Sugden (1986, ch. 4).
43 Similar points can be raised about non-moral conventional rules.
For example, it is not done to be rude in most, if not all societies.
However, by reminding me of this conventional prohibition, you have
not told me from which actions I should refrain.
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eventually come out with a first-order expectation
about your action—which is what I need in order to
know how I should act. (Lewis 1969, p. 31)
So far so good; let’s go through the steps of Lewis’ account
again. First, consider the salience of TL. It cannot be reason
to choose T at all. For if it were Table 3 would be an
incorrect representation of the predicament of A. If salience
would be a reason to opt for T, A and B are not immersed in
a coordination problem in the first place. For A would have
an independent reason to choose T and B, if he believes this
to be the case has overwhelming reason to choose L. Thus it
looks like the salience of T is not a reason to choose T at all.
And this is how it should be, since neither A nor B have
independent reasons to opt for T or L respectively, given
that they are facing a coordination problem.44
Secondly, on Lewis’ account higher-order reasons can
add to the justificatory weight of lower-order (in particular,
first-order) reasons. Exactly how do they do this? Well,
according to Lewis, the reasoning goes something like this45:
(i) A will choose T, on condition that B chooses L.
(ii) A believes that B will choose L.
(iii) Therefore, A has a reason to choose T.
Assumption (i) is not remarkable—it follows from the
description of the coordination problem and the assumption
that A is rational. Assumption (ii) is more problematic.
What justifies (ii)? What is the warrant for A’s belief about
B’s action? It is a second-order belief about B’s beliefs
about A’s actions:
(iv) A believes that B will choose L on condition that A
choose T.
(v) A believes that B believes that A will choose T.
(vi) Therefore, A has reason to believe that B has reason
to choose L.
(vii) Since A believes that B is rational to a certain
degree, A has reason to believe that B will in fact
choose L.
(viii) Therefore, A believes that B will choose L, which is
assumption (ii).
Again, steps (iv) and (vii) are not remarkable. The
assumption that is doing the justifying work is (v), a
second-order belief. We can give a similar justification for
(v) with non-remarkable assumptions and the third-order
belief that A believes that B believes that A believes that
will choose L.
At this point, we should get a little worried about the
whole account for two reasons. First, higher-order beliefs
can only justify lower-order beliefs if these higher-order
beliefs have independent justificatory weight of their own.
Just like I am entitled to infer q from p and p ? q if I have
reason to accept the premise p ? q independently of the
conclusion that q, I am entitled to infer an nth-order belief
from a belief of the order n + 1, if there is independent
ground for accepting n + 1.
Now, usually the order of justification of beliefs is
bottom up. That is, I am entitled to infer that I believe that I
believe that p, if I believe that p; just like my belief that p,
is justified if p.46 So what grounds these higher-order
beliefs? Notice that this sets up a regress. This leads us into
the second reason for worry: if the order of justification is
the usual one mentioned just now, the belief of the order
n + 1 does not have any further justificatory weight than
the belief of the order n. My belief that p is not further
justified by my belief that I believe that p. The justification
for both beliefs, in the end, is the same, namely, that p.
So it looks like Lewis needs to cut off the regress and do
this in such a way that each additional order of belief indeed
carries independent extra justificatory weight. At this point
Lewis introduces the idea of common knowledge. The idea
is that common knowledge of the salience of TL justifies the
generation of the higher-order beliefs. To be precise, the
salience of TL is common knowledge if and only if:47
(i) Both A and B have reason to believe that TL is salient.
(ii) This salience indicates to A and B that each has reason
to believe that TL is salient.
(iii) The salience of TL indicates to both A and B, that they
will choose T and L respectively.
These three assumptions combined make the salience of
TL common knowledge to A and B. With non-remarkable
assumptions about the rationality of A and B, each higher-
order belief can be inferred
(iv) Therefore, A has reason to believe that B will choose
L
(v) And, A has reason to believe that B believes that A
believes that B will choose L (and vice versa)
(vi) Etc., etc…
In other words, A has ground to accept an nth-order belief
about B choosing L, if it is common knowledge that TL is
salient. This is why the salience of TL is part of the reason
for A to choose T. If TL were not salient, A and B could
not have common knowledge of it and the requisite higher-
order beliefs could not be justified. This means that the
order of justification of the higher-order beliefs is the usual
one, from lower to the higher order. Common knowledge
of salience could only have this justifying effect if (iii)
44 See above for an explanation of this sense of independence. See
also Den Hartogh (2002, p. 6).
45 See Lewis (1969, pp. 28–31). I have substituted his formulations
with my example where appropriate.
46 In more formal notation: B(p) ‘ B(B(p)) and p ‘ B(p).
47 Lewis (1969, p. 52).
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holds, the salience of TL indicates to both A and B, that
they will choose T and L respectively. That is, the salience
of TL is already a reason to choose T and L respectively—
be it not a sufficient one.
This then generates the dilemma for Lewis. Either sal-
ience is a reason for choosing TL, or it is not. (i) If it is,
then the higher-order beliefs can be justified under the
assumption of common knowledge of the moral salience of
TL. However, then we would have to doubt that there is a
coordination problem in the first place. The moral salience
of TL would already be a reason for A to choose T and a
Lewis convention to go to TL would never arise—it would
be the only possible point of coordination. (ii) If moral
salience is not a reason for choosing TL, then the lower-
order beliefs (up to the order 1) could be inferred from the
higher-order beliefs and successful coordination will result.
However, these higher-order beliefs are not themselves
justified. They seem a contingent feature of the agents
involved, which brings back the contingency complaint in
full force.
8 Implications of the Dilemma
Returning to the question as to whether moral norms can be
analyzed as Lewis conventions, we now see that arguing
that a convention not to commit murder is the result of the
moral salience of such an outcome, gives away the game.
For if it is correct, if moral reasons somehow determine the
salience of this outcome, the norm not to commit murder
could not be a Lewis convention. It would impale the
defender of Lewisian conventionalism in ethics to the first
horn of the dilemma. If, on the other hand, the defender of
conventionalism wishes to avoid this, he will have to argue
that the convention not to commit murder is not the result
of moral salience. He will then have to accept that this
moral norm is contingent. We could have had other moral
norms about murder.
So where does this leave the conventionalist approach to
moral philosophy? It seems to me that there are at least
three responses open to the conventionalist. First, one
could bite the bullet and argue that indeed moral relativism
is true and that moral norms are contingent. This would
embrace the second horn of the dilemma I sketched above.
This need not be wrong in the end, but I believe it concedes
too much too quickly to the critics of the conventionalist
approach. The second line of inquiry that is open to the
conventionalist is the one taken by evolutionary game
theorists’ efforts to analyze morality.48 In evolutionary
game theory individual rationality of the agents is not
assumed. All that is assumed is that there is some way in
which agents copy successful strategies. Evolutionary
game theory can show that in some circumstances,
behavioural patterns will evolve which are stable and
conventional in the sense that alternative stable patterns are
possible as well. The question of rational justification of
either the convention or individual compliance does not
come up at all in this approach.
Both these versions of conventionalism have in common
that they accept that there is no ultimate justification for the
existence of the convention. At best, there is a causal story
to tell how the convention emerged. In addition, they can
give an answer to the question why conventions can and
sometimes do persist. Such causal stories, though impor-
tant, are of limited interest to moral philosophers who want
to evaluate entire practices and moral norms.
9 The Legacy of Lewis
This does not mean that Lewisian conventionalism is
irrelevant for moral philosophy—far from it. There are
many issues and problems in moral philosophy that can be
fruitfully tackled with conventionalist models. I want to
end this essay by mentioning one, which is an example of
the third possible response of the conventionalist.49 This
third response makes a distinction between questions about
the justification of convention and questions about the
justification of complying with the convention. This
response than amounts to arguing that higher-order beliefs
have justificatory weight, but denies that common knowl-
edge of salience justifies the existing pattern of mutually
interdependent higher-order beliefs that is prevalent among
those complying with the convention. The thought is that
Lewisian conventionalism cannot really answer the former
type of question, but that it has a persuasive answer to the
latter type of argument.
Moral philosophers are, among other things, interested
in justifying to individual agents why they should comply
(as opposed to merely conform) with moral norms. That is,
they are interested in analyzing the authority of moral
norms. Lewisian conventionalism can account for this
authority. It can show that individual agents have good
reasons to comply with existing moral conventions.
48 I am thinking of such authors as Sugden (1986); Binmore (1994);
Skyrms (1996); Binmore (1998);Vanderschraaf (1999); Kuhn (2004);
Skyrms (2004).
49 This is by no means intended as an exhaustive list of responses.
There are many more. For example, Postema in this volume suggests
an altogether different interpretation of salience. I have left out the
literature on collective intentionality from the discussion since that
would complicate the discussion of Lewis enormously. Postema, in
this volume, has some interesting things to say on this.
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We have already seen an example of how this works in
the example of Table 3. Suppose A and B are members of a
community that follows the convention ‘‘when A choose T,
when B choose L’’. The existence of such a TL-convention
means that there exists a pattern of inter-locking mutual
expectations that people will follow this convention. This
means that both A and B have reason to do their part in the
TL-convention. What is more, they are justified in doing
so, since both A and B have access to higher-order beliefs
about the choice of strategy of the other. In fact the con-
vention, the norm, that prescribes TL is nothing other than
a whole set of such higher-order beliefs. These beliefs
justify their choosing T and L respectively.
Obviously, these higher-order beliefs are contingent and
as a result the convention is to some degree contingent
(though the possible range of alternatives to the convention
is restricted). However, compliance with such an existing
convention is justified in a straightforward manner: it is
rationally required. Once it is in place, all members of this
community have sufficient reason to comply with it. The
fact that this community follows the TL-convention is
sufficient reason for each individual member to comply. In
other words, the TL-convention has authority over A and B
where it comes to their choice of strategy in Table 3.
Similar analyses can be given for other contexts of inter-
action as we have seen. Therefore, in all those instances
Lewisian conventionalism can explain and justify the
authority of many of our moral norms.50
This then suggest how the third response to the dilemma
goes. We can accept that higher-order beliefs are free-
standing. The way these are generated is essentially causal
and not rational. In that sense conventionalism indeed has
the implication that moral norms are contingent. However,
we need not follow the evolutionary game-theorists in their
dismissal of individual rationality. Instead, we can show
that rational agents should comply with these conventions
even though there may be nothing intrinsically rational
about these conventions in the first place.
Lewis’ work on conventions continues to inspire moral
philosophers to tackle such difficult questions. In the pro-
cess we sometimes have to modify or even reject elements
of Lewis’ own theory. However, it is a mark of the
importance and continuing legacy of Lewis’ Convention 40
years after its first appearance, that we still use it as our
starting point of theorizing.51
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